Publishing with the author’s permission Chapter 10: Mactan and Lapu-lapu, excerpted from his monumental book “Ferdinand Magellan: The Armada de Maluco and the European Discovery of the Philippines” (Spanish Galleon Publisher, Philippines, 2016) to commemorate the historical battle of Mactan which occurred on April 27, 1521.

Danilo M. Gerona’s account corrects misrepresentations or inaccuracies contained in Philippine history books. First, the island of Mactan at the time of Magellan’s arrival was composed of not just one baranganic settlement ruled by one chieftain. There were at least four chieftains, three of whom were allied with Lapu-lapu, while the other from Sula was allied with Rajah Humabon of Cebu. Second, contrary to the traditional national imagination of Lapu-lapu as a muscular young warrior chief, the hero of Mactan was possibly around 70 years old. Because of his old age, Lapu-lapu directed the famed battle from a safe location on the shore. His warriors were the ones who dealt Magellan the bodily injuries that caused his death. Third, the village of Opon, which was ruled by Lapu-lapu, was a Muslim settlement and thus averse to evangelization. Oral accounts claimed he arrived from Borneo when the harbor of Sugbo began to acquire the reputation as a major seaport. As the powerful chieftain of a village in a small island, sources suggested Lapu-lapu’s fame or notoriety might have emanated from his successful pillaging. His piratical exploits, in fact, attracted following and loyalty from the Mactan chieftains, except for Sula. Nevertheless, the author acknowledges Lapu-lapu’s rightful place in history, “The death of Magellan was regarded as the triumph of native resistance to imperialist pretensions of the Europeans and hailed Lapu-lapu not only as its rallying point but its hero.” It took 44 years before a Spanish expedition could return to Cebu and establish a colony on April 27, 1565.

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MACTAN AND LAPU-LAPU

His was the first Spanish blood which dropped as a sacred gift on the land of the Philippines. It was the blood of a hero, a wise and good Christian, which produced bountiful blessings.

– Fray Eladio Zamora, Las Corporaciones Religiosas en Filipinas (1901)

Table of Contents:

Local Politics and The Chieftains of Mactan

The village of Cebu was surrounded by numerous settlements, the most important were located on the other side of what they regarded as a canal, an island invariably referred to in various sources as Matan or Mauthan but commonly referred to as Mactan. The mid-nineteenth century authors of the geographic dictionary, Friars Buzeta and Bravo, placed the location of Mactan as “an island adjacent to the eastern coast of Cebu, with size reaching some 2-1/2 square leagues.” In the middle of the nineteenth century, a journey from Cebu to this island took an hour by the fast-sailing boat, it certainly is much lesser today.

At the time of the arrival of the Legazpi expedition in Cebu in 1565, Juan de la Isla, one of the officers of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi expedition, found Mactan “swampy, largely inhospitable, and sparsely inhabited (Otra llamada Matan quasi despoblada y llena del mal pais y mucha parte anegada que es donde mataron a Magallanes).” Some seven years after de la Isla’s report, the 1571 Relacion or account of encomiendas, the Isla de Matan was described by the Escribano (clerk) of Legazpi as “fronting Cebu and that Mactan and the island of Bohol and the two other islands called Camotes are all uninhabited (la ysla de matan frontero de la de cubu. Contodos los naturales della y todas las demas ysletas despobladas. Que ysta entre la dzaysla de matan e laysia de bojol y las dos ysletas que llaman de Camotes…).” Captain Miguel de Loarca’s 1581 report on the status of encomiendas described the island of Mactan as “farther by two shots of arquebus (dos tiros de arcabuz)” at the southern portion of the “poblacion de Cubu.” It had about four leagues in circumference and half a league in width, inhabited by some three hundred indios in four or five small settlements, probably the same settlements in existence at the time of Magellan’s arrival.

The Mactan seen by the men of the Legazpi expedition was presumably different from what Magellan encountered in 1521. Although full-length documentary reports about the demographic and political conditions prevailing during the time of Lapu-lapu were virtually non-existent, sporadic and sketchy references to the island provide glimpses into the geographic setting and incipient settlement morphology. Francisco Albo, a member of the Magellan expedition, wrote in his Derrotero or logbook a sketchy description of what he called Matan: “we went S.W. and 4 S., a matter of 12 leagues, as far as 10 1/3 degrees, and there we entered a channel between two islands, one called Matan, and the other Subo.

The name Mactan, according to Francisco Combes, a late seventeenth century Jesuit chronicler, was derived from the Visayan words Ma-agtan, meaning, the “island of negritoes or the island of agtas. Combes theory evidently lacked strength since there was no surviving folk story which mentioned the island had been inhabited by agtas. On the other hand, existing folk stories attributed the name of Mactan to piratical activities. In fact, the apocryphal version of the genealogy of the early ruling families of Cebu, the Aginid, Bayok sa atong Tawarik, claimed it was derived from mangati or mangatang, a Visayan word for pirate. Historical records seemed to confirm this folk account of the etymology. The seventeenth century Mentrida dictionary defined the Cebuano word mangati as “to be a thief or to rob (al ladron y al robar).” Other sources inferred the connection between the words mangati with magtang or mactan. In describing the island in his 1630 Historia, the Augustinian chronicler, Juan Medina, wrote: “…fronting it, very near, is an island called Magtang, where they killed in ancient times Capitan Magallanes.” The association of the name with plundering led to the belief that the natives of Mactan were pirates.

The raiding activities interpreted by Europeans as piracy, no doubt, appear to them to be essentially economic and political, as it involved the control of persons and resources, but seen in the eye of the sixteenth century Visayan, it underlies a cosmological or mystical strains which defined the morphology of power and authority in the native ideological frame. Drawing from the studies made by Filipino and American scholars on the cosmological bases of Visayan polities, inter-village wars ceased to be confined to purely materialist economic pursuits but a competitive enterprise for prestige and the increase of mystical power, a factor which underlies warfare in the ancient Philippines. Piracy was apparently a way of life of the pre-European Visayans, carried out not only as an act of retribution to their enemies but as an expression of prowess and, therefore, a source of social prestige. Some historians speculated that the range of these waves of raiding spree was not only confined to the Visayan coastal villages but even reached as far as China. Lapu-lapu’s piratical exploits attracted following and loyalty from the chieftains in the island of Mactan, except for Sula.

Unlike what was popularly held in Philippine history, the island of Mactan at the time of Magellan’s arrival was composed not just of one baranganic settlement but by at least four or five. One of these was mentioned by Pigafetta as Bulaia or Buaia. In his 1742 chronicle of their missions, the Jesuit historian, Juan Delgado, made a passing remark to a “Punta de Bulilla,” probably the same village of Bulaia or Buaia, located on the northeastern portion of Mactan island. Some of the Magellan crew, according to the sixteenth century historian, Antonio Herrera, identified this village as “a small Muslim settlement (lugar pequeño de moros)” which Scott suspected to be a Bornean outpost. Although Muslim presence until this time was still largely confined to Mindanao or to certain portions of Luzon such as Manila, the alleged presence of a Muslim community in the Visayas was a useful ideological fiction for the Magellan expedition which justified belligerent response under the rubric of the Reconquista.

Other than Bulaia or Bulilla or Buaia, at least three more villages were mentioned in the 1521 reports, one was ruled by Sula, an ally of Humabon. The other two villages were not identified in any available sources, but one of those mentioned, and the most important, was Opon, the settlement located on the southwest of Mactan, three miles across the channel east of Cebu. In 1850, Buzeta and Bravo described this village, then already a town, as “having earned the unfortunate reputation in history for being the ancient settlement of Mactan, inhabited by the natives who killed the famous Fernando Magallanes.” Owing to the importance of this settlement, Opon came to be identified by the locals as Mactan itself, as Pigaffeta did, which he described as a “considerable town.” The island of Mactan at the time of Magellan’s arrival was comparatively well populated. If four or five settlements were distributed in an area which, according to the Buzeta and Bravo dictionary, occupied some two and a half square leagues or approximately fourteen square kilometers, each village had an average area of about three-square kilometers.

Except for Sula, the rest of the villages were allied with, if not subject to, Lapu-lapu. The root of the quarrel between Sula and Lapu-lapu was not known but certainly aggravated, if not caused, by his alliance with Humabon, the chieftain of Cebu. Historical sources depicted Sula as a minor character in this quarrel, for the two contending forces were Humabon and Lapu-lapu. This chieftain of Opon, and acknowledged ruler of Mactan, notwithstanding the magnitude of his role in the events, remains an historical enigma. Referred to in various forms as Cilapulapu, Calipulaku or Lapu-lapu, this chief was barely mentioned in the few eyewitness accounts and even in secondary sources. Even the foremost narrator of the Magellan expedition, Pigafetta, only devoted few lines on this chieftain and most certainly had not seen him. Except for the sketchy information provided by contemporary sources, most information about Lapu-lapu was derived from secondary narratives, if not, mainly speculative, and thus lacking or devoid at all of historical or documentary basis. Most of what is known about Lapu-lapu in recent times was embedded in folk myths and legends but heavily loaded with nationalist discourses.”

The legendary tale traced the rise of Mactan settlements to his coming. Lapu-lapu, surnamed in one of these local folklores as Dimantag was said to have come from Borneo, the assumed geographic origin of most ancient Filipino folk heroes and leaders. This folk story claimed that Lapu-lapu arrived in this place when the harbor of Sugbo was beginning to acquire the reputation as a major seaport and thus became known colloquially as sinibuayang hingpit (“the place for trading”).

Local accounts identified Lapu-lapu as the son of Mangal whose wife was Matang Mantaunas or Bauga. Lapulapu, according to a folk story, had a family, with a wife named Bulakna and a son Sawili. Bulakna, was the daughter of a chieftain of the island of the neighboring island of Olango named Sabtano. Some oral accounts even claimed that Lapu-lapu did not only have a son but a number of children, one could have been a defiant chief named Dagami, who ruled the village of Gabi, a village in the island of Mactan

Even the name of this defiant chieftain defied definition, since no one really knows where it came from nor what it really meant, and no attempt was made to decode its origin. But a cave located in the hills near San Antonio, about seven kilometers south of Bogo, Cebu, was known to old residents as lapos lapos, meaning, “a hole that penetrates through and through.” A word in the Mentrida dictionary, lapos, was defined as “to penetrate from one part to the other with sword, lance, etc. (estocada, lanzada, puñalada) or anything which is transparent such as the light on the glass, an angel, a soul or glorious body passing through the wall…” The chieftain’s fame as an agile warrior in his younger days could have earned for him this sobriquet, a physical quality attributed to the few surviving oral accounts and legends. It was probably because of this quality drawn from the meaning of his name that Lapu-lapu’s distinctive physical features as a young, fierce and muscular warrior were immortalized in history, carved in monuments and depicted in numerous paintings. But in the absence of any known historical document from which this national imagination of Lapu-lapu was made, it is theoretically imperative to raise questions about this folk hero.

The sixteenth century Portuguese historian who died about 1563, Gaspar Correa, was the only European chronicler who provided the only clue into the personality of this Mactan chieftain, an information he obtained from the reports of the survivors of the Magellan expedition. Contrary to the traditional national imagination of Lapu-lapu as a muscular young warrior chief, who fought and killed Magellan, Correa described this hero of Mactan as one very old (veljo in Portuguese and viejo in Spanish), probably about seventy at the time of Magellan’s arrival in Cebu. In the eyes of the European, a person was officially or legally classified as viejo when one reached the age of sixty. In fact, when the Spaniards introduced the system of encomienda, exemptions from certain colonial obligations were given to the reservados, people who were sixty years old and above.

Gines de Mafra, one of the crew of Magellan who became knowledgeable of the Visayan islands because of his participation in the subsequent Loaysa expedition, indicated in his testimony that the chieftain, Kulambo, whom he met twice, confessed that Humabon’s wife was the sister of Lapu-lapu. This made Humabon and Lapu-lapu brothers-in-law. But the mention of Pigafetta of Humabon’s wife as very young, would seem that de Mafra was referring to an older wife, probably his original or principal wife. Were it true, whatever happened to Humabon’s marriage or to his wife could be one of the causes of the quarrel between Humabon and Lapu-lapu. Local sources also claimed that Sula, the chieftain of one of the villages in Mactan, was also Lapu-lapu’s brother-in-law, who regarded him as a rival to control Mactan.

The Pigafetta account, the most temporally proximate narrative to the event, affirmed the martial prominence of Lapu-lapu over the rest of the local chiefs: “The nearest island was called Mauthan, the king of which excelled the others in number of soldiers and in arms…” Other sources shared similar impressions. The sixteenth century Spanish chronicler, Fernandez de Oviedo, who drew his information from the survivors of the post-Magellanic expeditions such as that of the Loaisa in 1525, was among those who confirmed this impression of Pigafetta. In his narrative, Fernandez de Oviedo described the chieftain of Mactan as a “king or chieftain so much esteemed for being an excellent man in the art of war, and very powerful than all the rest of the residents.” All available information, regardless of the degree of their historical truth value, agree on one point, Lapu-lapu was feared as a powerful chieftain, enjoying the submission not only of his subjects but of other chieftains from nearby villages.

Identified in Opon’s oral accounts as among Lapu-lapu’s elite contemporaries in the village were Bali-alho and Kambalikig. Another folk story mentioned of his friendship with Tindok-Bukid, chief of a village now called barrio Maragondon. Umindig of barrio Ibo, Sagpang Baha or Sampung Baha and Bugto Pasan. They could have been his relatives or even family members. Lapu-lapu was probably related also to a number of powerful chiefs of other villages even outside the island.

The root of the quarrel between Humabon and Lapu-lapu was not established in history. But certain facts derived both from archival and oral sources tend to offer an insight into the cause of their enmity, aside from the possible issue of their familial relationship. An existing legend claimed that Lapu-lapu asked Humabon for a place to settle and was offered the place called Mandawili (now Mandaue), including the island Opong (or Opon), hoping that Lapu-lapu’s people would devote their efforts in the cultivation of the agricultural potentials of the land. Lapu-lapu succeeded in doing so, and the influx of farm produce from Mandawili enriched the trade port of Sugbo further. The relationship between Lapu-lapu and Humabon deteriorated later on when this Mactan chief raided merchant ships passing by the island of Opong, which adversely affected the flourishing commercial activities in Sugbo. The island thus earned the name Mangatang (literally “bandit” or “those who lie in ambush”), later evolving to “Mactan.” The Mentrida dictionary referred to this as magahat, “to kill or injure with the purpose of plunder (matar, o herir, salteando por robar).” Essentially regarded as apocryphal, this local account seemed to find logical support from historical sources.

It is strange that the chieftain of one of the villages of such a small island as Mactan, with a virtually unproductive terrain, earned the fear of the neighboring villages and even those of other islands. What were the bases of his prestige and power? A few sources suggested that his fame or notoriety as a powerful chieftain emanated from his successful pillaging or piratical career, as it had been mentioned earlier. The Visayans referred to this form of piracy as nangayao which, according to Mentrida means to “rob like pirates by the sea or attack some towns or islands.” Fray Aganduru Moriz, who had a personal knowledge of Cebu in the early years of their evangelization, explained that:

In that place natives esteemed the brave men inasmuch as those who became lords were thieves. Their entire lives were devoted in the sea as pirates, and on land as plunderers, for this reason, as men accustomed to perennial war, they lived not only in their houses but in their village as men without fear nor duties.

Lapu-lapu’s piratical raids which robbed the inhabitants of the settlements not only of objects of value but also persons to be ransomed or redeemed from slavery, brought him substantial wealth. Some entries in the Mentrida dictionary gave a rough estimate of the material value for the ransom of a slave such as tilon, the fourth part of a slave and has the equivalent amount of a tael de oro.” It is not remotely possible that the large portion of Lapu-lapu’s potential victims were Humabon’s clients, the domestic and foreign merchant ships docking in the harbor of Cebu.

The village of Opon, the base of Lapu-lapu’s insular domain, stood strategically at the entrance to the strait towards the port of Cebu. As observed by William Henry Scott, Mactan’s location placed Lapu-lapu in a position to intercept shipping in Cebu harbor. On the northeastern coastline of Mactan, near the village of Buaya, a promontory stood by known to the Spaniards as Punta Engaño (Deception Point), but popular among the natives as Pangusan. The Spaniards gave the appellation Punta Engaño because vessels heading towards the Port of Cebu were oftentimes misled and proceeded instead to Mactan. Lapu-lapu capitalized on these “deceived” vessels which he charged with port taxes or even seized their goods which significantly affected the trade in Cebu.

The notoriety of the village’s piratical activities could be the reason for acquiring the village’s name. Lapu-lapu’s Opon, could have been a variation of Opangor Opol, which seemed to support the impression of some chroniclers regarding the chief’s occupational specialization. A word Opong was listed among the entries in the Mentrida dictionary, its definition hardly shed light on the historical implication of its toponym. But two other words, with slight phonetical variations offered more relevant implications: Opol which means “to block a road, a river or a pass with trees or thorns” or Opang which means “to create enemies or quarrel with others.”

The Requirimiento and Lapu-Lapu’s Response

Magellan’s coming to Cebu gave Humabon the opportunity to finally decide the issue between him and Lapu-lapu. Magellan’s intervention in the conflict between the allies Sula and Humabon against Lapu-lapu was an obligation emanating from the pact of alliance entered into during the sandugo, which transformed their relationship no longer between a master and a subject, but between blood-brothers. Humabon’s baptism further cemented their relationship by elevating their bond from being mere blood-brothers to spiritual brothers. More than a simple compliance of duty in a compact which Magellan might not even have considered with seriousness, was his colonialist agenda. Magellan’s sympathy with Humabon dovetailed not only with the consequence of a formalized treaty of blood brotherhood but also of colonial interests in reducing to submission, if not eliminate, Lapu-lapu who stood on the way of their shared commercial and political opportunities. For these purposes, Magellan nonetheless acted as a colonial overlord, issuing a decree appointing Humabon the supreme chief of the island of Cebu and those of the neighboring islands.

Magellan also sent representatives to other villages, announcing their presence and demanding submission to the Spanish king and his representative. This ceremonial demand for native submission was known to sixteenth century Spanish conquistadores as the Requirimiento. The Spanish imperial intrusion in local societies in the sixteenth century Americas was not only characterized by enormous bloodletting but also by colorful ceremonies an uninformed eye could easily ignore as unimportant, the Requirimiento, was among them. According to the eminent scholar on the sixteenth century Latin American history, Lesley Byrd Simpson, this Requerimiento was a document concocted by the advisers of Ferdinand the Catholic which the Spanish explorers were supposed to read to the Indians before undertaking the conquest. The introductory part of the Requerimiento laid down the historical and philosophical justification for colonization by providing a brief outline of the history of the world:

On the part of the King, Don Fernando, and Doña Juana, his daughter, Queen of Castile and Leon, subduers of the barbarous nations, we their servants notify and make known to you, as best we can, that the Lord our God, Living and Eternal, created heaven and earth, and one man and one woman, of whom you and we, and all the men in the world, were and are descendants, and all those who come after us. But, on account of the multitude which has sprung from the man and woman in the five thousand years since the world was created, it was inevitable that some men should go one way and some another, and that they should be divided into many kingdoms and provinces, for in one alone they could not be sustained.

This first part concludes with the establishment of the papacy and the donation by Alexander VI to the kings of Spain. This was followed by the requirement of the indios who heard the announcement, for which reason this document was called, to accept two obligations. The first was the acknowledgement of the church as the ruler and superior of the whole world and the pope as God’s vicar. By virtue of the papal donation, the king and the queen were to serve as authorities in his stead as superiors and lords of the land. The second obligation was for the natives to allow the faith to be preached to them. If the Indians did not accept the message contained in it they could be subjugated by force of arms and their goods confiscated:

We shall take you and your wives and your children, and shall make slaves of them, and as such shall sell and dispose of them as their Highnesses may command; and we shall take away your goods, and shall do all the harm and damage intr that we can, as to vassals who do not obey, and refuse to receive their lord, and resist and contradict him; and we protest that the deaths and losses which shall accrue from this are your fault, and not that of their Highnesses, or ours, nor of these cavaliers who come with us.

The formulation of this colonialist declaration was used shortly after the arrival of the fleet of Pedrarias in the New World on June 14, 1514. On this date, Pedrarias ordered the notary (who eventually became the chronicler of the Indies), Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, to accompany a reconnoitering expedition of some three hundred men to read the Requirimiento as demanded by law. After undertaking a long march, the contingent reached a deserted village where Oviedo declared with an air of humor: “My Lords, it appears to me that these Indians will not listen to the theology of this requirement, and that you have no one who can make them understand it; would Your Honor be pleased to keep it until we have some one of these Indians in a cage, in order that he may learn it at his leisure and my Lord Bishop may explain it to him.” Notwithstanding its absurdity it had become a standard formula for any conquering expeditions to recite. According to Lewis Hanke, a pre- eminent twentieth century American scholar of the early history of the Spanish colonization of the New World, since natives always fled once they got wind of the presence of the advancing horde of conquistadores, this ritual of the Requirimiento turned ridiculous as it was read before trees and empty huts or invoked league away before commencing a formal attack. Not one source mentioned that this standard imperialist formula of conquest had ever been invoked verbatim by the representatives of Magellan during their encounter with the natives of Cebu, or with those they encountered earlier.

Aside from the subtle feature of Spanish ritual of possession, the planting of the cross, a distinctively pious ceremony, was actually a symbolic representation of taking possession. Different imperial powers dramatized their official declaration of acquiring dominion over the territory by a variety of symbolic acts performed and devices installed in the locality. At the time of the Magellan expedition, the Portuguese used stone pillars called padroes as signaling their occupation of the territory, patterned after the Roman custom of stone markers. The Spaniards employed the cross to announce their control of the territory. Such was the ritual performed by Balboa when he discovered the Mar del Sur (later on renamed Mar Pacifico by Magellan) as recorded by Fernandez de Oviedo: “And Vasco Nuñez, with a dagger which he carried in his belt, cut a cross in a tree, into which he dashed sea water in token of the possession thus taken; and he made two more crosses in two other trees, so that there should be three, in reverence to the most Holy Trinity. …And afterwards all those who were there made many crosses in other trees, and cut down some with their swords, so continuing the act of possession.”

In accordance with this ritual, when Magellan planted the cross on the hill in Limasawa and later on in Cebu, he was not only carrying out a religious mandate but at the same time performing his task as a commander of the fleet taking possession of the territory for Spain. It may also be possible that it was actually performed but the sources, such as Pigafetta, simply considered it unimportant in the overall narrative of their discovery since the natives casually accepted their presence and thus deliberately omitted its mention. At any rate, although Magellan did not adopt the specific formula, the substantive features of this dramatic ritual of colonization were consistently and subtly integrated in more casual affairs of their daily interaction.

Magellan’s endorsement of Humabon caused so much rejoicing among his allies but was received with fury by Lapu-lapu and his followers. Far from the response Magellan expected, only two obeyed this decree, Sula and Humabon, the rest of the chieftains dismissed Magellan’s messenger with ridicule. The most vocal in his opposition from among these chieftains was, of course, Lapu-lapu, who, according to the sixteenth century Augustinian historian, Fray Aganduru Moriz, did not only send away the messengers with ridicule but defiantly declared, “he was the Lord of that island and that neither he nor his forefathers have recognized vassalage to anybody, nor even considered recognizing anyone, that he should not touch him, for they would defend themselves.” Lapu-lapu’s alleged defiant reaction suggests that even long before his rule, no other ruler outside his own lineage had ever wielded authority over them.

According to Pigafetta, within the eight-day period, while the series of baptism was going on, “we burned a village because the inhabitants would not obey either the king or us. There we planted a cross because the people were gentiles; if they had been Moors, we should have erected a column as a sign of the hardness of heart, because the Moors are more difficult to convert than the Gentiles.” This raid could have taken place around the third week of April, as indicated by Gomara, although other sources claimed that Magellan sent two bateles at midnight of April 26. Peter Martyr, who derived his facts from the members of the crew, made a passing remark on this event:

Leaving the ships at Zubo, Magellan crossed to the island of Matam, visible on the horizon at a distance of only four leagues. He used the shallops and the native boats dug out of tree trunks. His intention and was to persuade the ruler of Matam, through his interpreters, to make his submission to the great King of Spain, and to the chief of Zubo, and to pay tributes to the former. The king answered that he was willing to obey the King of Spain, but not the chieftain of Zubo. Thereupon Magellan ordered a fortress composed of about fifty houses, near the royal residence, to be sacked and burnt. He afterwards returned to Zubo, bringing his booty, some foodstuff which were needed there, as well as several pieces of furniture; but the inhabitants of Zubo, who were hostile to the islanders of Matam, stole the greater part from him.

Although there were at least three chieftains in the island of Mactan who expressed their defiance to Magellan, the “ruler of Matam” being referred to was Lapu-lapu and the village was Opon, located on the west coast of Mactan, facing Cebu. Opon, Lapu-lapu’s baranganic enclave, was among the series of coastal villages lying on the western portion of Mactan Island and therefore immediately accessible from Cebu where the Magellan fleet was docked.

To leave a palpable mark of Spanish punitive justice, as a warning to other defiant chiefs, Magellan raised a cross right on the place where the settlement he torched once stood. The residents of this settlement, as their domiciles had been reduced to ashes, and fearing another attack, decided to transfer their settlement to the northeastern coast of Mactan where those of the chiefs allied to Lapu-lapu, such as that of Buaia, were located. Antonio de Herrera also mentioned this “midnight raid” but added that this took place a day after Magellan sent an emissary to the Mactan chief warning him to burn his village should he refuse to obey Humabon. The few eyewitness reports, such as that of Gines de Mafra, indicated that Mactan was raided twice and resulted in the destruction of at least two villages.

These raids only increased the determination of Lapu-lapu and his allies to resist the Spaniards. Primary sources claimed that the reason which prompted Magellan to explode in anger was Lapu-lapu’s alleged refusal to kiss the hand of Humabon as an acknowledgement of his subordination. As an ally and a blood-brother, Magellan had earlier assured Humabon to enforce his authority, protect and support his sovereignty. The prominent late nineteenth century Filipinist, the ilustrado, T. H. Pardo de Tavera, raised doubts about besa mano or kissing of hand, being an issue. Tavera claimed that the kissing of the hand was a purely Spanish practice, “because among the Malayans this is not a customary practice as a sign of obedience and submission,” he wrote. It was his conclusion that neither Lapu-lapu, Sula nor Humabon knew the ceremony of besa mano!

It is not clear if besa mano was already a prevailing custom among the natives during Magellan’s arrival, but neither it is clear if this was truly an issue. In a similar vein, according to Scott, when Magellan tried to force Lapu-lapu to acknowledge Humabon as overlord, the paramount chief of the villages of Mactan replied that he was unwilling to come and do reverence to one whom he had been commanding for so long a time. The issue, however, boils down to Lapu-lapu’s refusal to express any formal sign of submission to Humabon who used to be his subject. Another member of the expedition who made his testimony upon their return in Spain, Fernando de Bustamante, barber-surgeon of the Victoria, in agreement with the other testimonies, also recalled that the natives of Mactan were actually willing to accept Spanish sovereignty but were not disposed to accept Humabon as their overlord: “…those of Mactan wished to obey the king of Castile but the said Ferdinand Magellan told them to kiss the hand of the king of Zebu and those do not wish to kiss the hand of the king of Zebu.”

Sources written almost contemporaneous to the event seemed to offer the most logical reason. They claimed that Magellan’s demand for formal proof of submission to his anointed leader was more than simple gestures of humiliating regal courtesies but had assumed an economic form, the customary payment of tributes. Francisco Lopez de Gomara, a sixteenth century Spanish chronicler, claimed that Magellan demanded from the local chieftains, as their sign of vassalage to the Spanish emperor, victuals and other commodities. Humabon readily promised to produce not only those asked of him but also a large jewel (gran joia) to be sent to the Spanish monarch. Two other chieftains also agreed, but the other two refused. One of these chieftains, identified by Gomara as Cilapu-lapu, defiantly responded that he would not obey anyone he did not know, even Humabon.

According to a manuscript by one who simply signed himself the Genoese pilot, but probably Maestre Bautista, Magellan demanded from one of the chieftains of Mactan, Lapu-lapu, among them, three goats, three pigs, three loads of rice, and three loads of millet and other provisions for the ships.” But the chieftain was prompt and straightforward with his reply. As to the “threes” being asked, he had no opposition in complying with “twos” and if Magellan was satisfied with these, they would be complied with at once. If not, he would send whatever pleased him. With an air of arrogance and defiance, the chieftain emphasized that he would not comply with the complete quantity being asked. What Lapu-lapu seemed to convey was that he was willing to provide the expedition with whatever it needed for their homeward journey, as the chieftain of Cebu was more than willing to do. But Lapu-lapu, emphasized that it should be according to his own terms, and subject to the compliance of his conditions, one of which was the Spaniards immediate departure. For Lapu-lapu, a more faithful compliance to the details of Magellan’s demands was tantamount to an open act of submission. As if uttering a warning, Lapu-lapu also emphasized that what truly mattered to him was not to waste time and munitions in what was not at all important. What would truly make him glad was to see the Spaniards leave Cebu port the soonest.

The reply of Lapu-lapu infuriated the captain-general who was further incensed when, on the 26th of April, one of the sons of Sula, the rival chieftain of Lapu-lapu in Mactan and ally of Humabon, only brought two goats, short of the amount he demanded. This man excused himself for failure to faithfully comply with his and his father’s obligation and blamed Lapu-lapu who threatened them should they faithfully comply with the demands of Magellan. It is impossible to sift through these words, to identify those truly said by Lapu-lapu or merely fabricated by the emissary to inflame Magellan. It could not be denied the possibility that one of them was provoking Magellan to wage war with the Mactan chieftain, an event Humabon and Sula could gain so much. If such war erupts, its outcome could destroy not only their common foe, Lapu-lapu but even probably Magellan, their ally and colonial overlord. It would not be far from truth to suspect that certain comments of Lapu-lapu were manipulated by these chiefs such as Sula to fuel Magellan’s anger. As it turned out, these words infuriated the Captain-General who also learned that a substantial number of natives in a village in Mactan, most probably that of Lapu-lapu, had assembled, prepared to defend themselves in battle in coordination with warriors from other villages, should Magellan’s men attack them.

On April 27, Magellan sent an emissary to the Mactan chief warning him, once and for all, of an attack should he continue to ignore his orders. Lapu-lapu however made a defiant reply: “if Magellan did so, he would be awaiting them.” As to what he was asking for, Lapu-lapu arrogantly refused to give “not so much because he does not have them but more for human reasons, that he would give those few goats and pigs only if he asked for them.” Convinced that this old chief was actually taunting him to a battle, Magellan decided to settle score with him. The reaction of Magellan was recorded by Fernandez Navarrete, who wrote:

Irritated by this report, Magellan prepared three bateles and 60 men he believed sufficient to fight with their fire arms these multitude of native warriors without consultation with Humabon and in disregard for the advice of Juan Serrano who dissuaded him from embarking on an enterprise he regarded as risky, imprudent, and frightening (this probably earned for Serrano the image of being a coward). Failing to sway Magellan’s decision, the Cebu chieftain was prepared to accompany him with a thousand of his warriors.

It was undeniable that the response of Lapu-lapu drew Magellan’s anger. Historians questioned Magellan’s reason for involving himself in the domestic power struggle of these insular chiefs since he still had a mission to accomplish. A late nineteenth century historian from Chile, Diego Barros Arana, blamed his explosive temper to his repressed belligerent impulse: “The martial temper of this old soldier of the Indies has turned worst, having journeyed for such a period of time and visited unknown places without encountering any challenge for using arms and displaying the wealth of his character as a daring adventurer (El espiritu marcial del antiguo soldado de la India se venia mal con las dilaciones; i talvez sentia haber navegado tanto tiempo i haber visitado paises desconocidos sin encontrar occasion de medir sus armas i de desplegar los recursos de su caracter osado i aventurero).

Sources varied in their interpretation of Humabon’s reaction to Magellan’s anger. Herrera claimed Humabon discouraged Magellan from taking violent action against Lapu-lapu since “he was informed that the two chiefs who accepted his authority and the other chief whose village he burned were already in Mactan waiting for him with six thousand men.” Aganduru Moriz, however, believed that Humabon welcomed the angry reaction of Magellan as he hoped to see the Mactan chieftain destroyed. This was also the impression in the Aginid.

The ever-cautious Juan Serrano who voiced out his disagreement with Magellan’s decision to wage war was worried about the lack of provisions and the number of able-bodied men still capable to fight. He even made a defiant answer that should Magellan insist on his plan, he should rather send somebody in his place. It appears that Serrano made good of his threat and did not join the group. Although the sentiment of the crew was not known, it seems they would not have approved of Magellan’s rashness. First, it was obviously against the instruction of the king which reiterated the need to employ a more diplomatic approach than to resort to coercive and military solutions. Likewise, by taking side in the local political intramural of the chieftains, Magellan was compromising not only his crew but the imperialist purpose of the expedition.

Buen Guerra and The Battle of Mactan

Magellan welcomed Lapu-lapu’s decision to engage his force to battle as his opportunity to prove his claim to superiority which he had been flaunting for some time to Humabon. As a veteran soldier, Magellan knew that to wage a justifiable war required a more reasonable ground over and above mere outburst of personal bravado and belligerent impulse. As one familiar with the politics of the Spanish incursion in the Americas, particularly of the Columbus expedition, Magellan knew that engaging in war demanded a solid legal and moral grounds unless one was willing to risk a grilling investigation and even prosecution in the Spanish court and returned a prisoner like what happened to Columbus.

The only reason which could validly justify Magellan to wage war, as all the other conquering expeditions, was when it was undertaken for religious purposes, a righteous war or Buen Guerra. It is along this perspective that the rumor of Lapu-lapu being a Muslim seems to acquire valid historical significance in the narrative. Although there was no any historical proof establishing Lapu-lapu’s religious affiliation to Islam, it served as the only useful justification for the Spaniards attack on Mactan, that it was a part of the war of Reconquista.

Magellan set out together with sixty well-armed men to face the formidable warriors of Lapu-lapu and his allies. Magellan was simply overwhelmed by his military temper and wounded pride since the men he was boasting of, except for their weaponry, were actually unprepared for this action since most were not professional soldiers, without previous combat experience. One nineteenth century British historian expressed his severe criticism for Magellan whom he accused of being “injudicious and impolitic as it was unjust..” This author concluded that this was another proof of Magellan’s unfitness for command. As survivors of the treacherous Pacific crossing, many were still too weak and indisposed to engage in a strenuous battle. Magellan thus could only pick sixty out of the few, particularly those he acknowledged for their unflinching loyalty.

Among those constituting his small assault force were his personal servants such as Cristobal de Rabelo, Antonio Pigafetta, Enrique, Francisco de Espinosa, sailor; Juan de Torres, bearer of arms; Rodrigo Nieto; Anton Gallego, cabin boy; Pedro, servant of the fleet’s alguacil, Gonzalo de Espinosa, Antón de Escobar. The other forty or more who went with him were not identified. The personal background of these few, as provided in the fleet’s manifest, hinted outright their lack of appropriate combat experience, being mere young men. But Magellan had cast his die. “We set out from Zubu at midnight, we were sixty men armed with corselets and helmets,” wrote Pigafetta. With them were Humabon, “the Christian king,” the prince, and some of the chief’s men, many others who were divided among twenty or thirty balanghai. Offered by Humabon his own phalanx of warriors, Magellan politely declined even boasting that “he had brought them, not to fight but to watch their bravery and fighting power.” It was April 27, 1521.

The group arrived in Mactan “three hours before daylight” which could mean past two o’clock in the morning, and even in the tropical summer climate, the hour was still dark. But with the early morning sky still lit with the moon on its last quarter phase, the huge number of fully loaded watercrafts stealthily crossing the channel between Cebu and Mactan could have been easily detected by their enemies guarding the shores of the opposite island. This impressive armada of Spanish and native allies headed towards a cluster of villages, including Opon, and Buaya, on the coast of what is now the Magellan Bay where, unknown to these attacking force, the natives had been anticipating their arrival. Pigafetta learned that the natives had dug up holes with spikes in the seashore as traps for the Spaniards. This was a common feature of their war tactic. Visayan vocabulary was replete with words pertaining to this strategy.

A negotiation was begun through the Muslim merchant, the same person who was baptized in Cebu, whom Magellan had instructed to relay to Lapu-lapu and his allies the ultimatum that “unless they recognize the Christian King (Humabon) as their sovereign, obey the King of Spain, pay us tribute, and the captain becomes their friend, we would prove how our lances inflict wound.” This emissary, according to the nineteenth century Jesuit historian, Pablo Pastells, was the Muslim Thai, who had to deliver another Requirimiento, to the Mactan chieftain (Antes de desembarcar envio’ Magallanes al moro siames para que repitiese sus requirimientos). Magellan’s threat was ignored and convinced that a war was imminent, told the group to wait until daylight before they began their assault. “We then leaped into the water up to our thighs, for on account of the shallow water and the rocks the boats could not come closer to the beach,” wrote Pigafetta. The shoreline of the bay of Mactan, particularly the area where the Spanish positioned themselves for battle, turned out to be Lapu-lapu’s natural ally but a geological nightmare for the Magellan forces.

Numerous studies on the geomorphological features of the shores of Mactan indicated that they were rugged and unevenly covered with corals with many places terraced. A number of theories were given on the geological origin of the island. Oral history traced the geological birth of Opon and the rest of Mactan Island, based on recovered fossils and surface analysis of the local terrain, to constant accumulation of corals. George Becker, a Harvard and German educated geologist and member of the United States Geological Survey, conducted a study on the geology of the islands in the early 1900, wrote about his findings on the coast of Mactan: “On a small scale off the coasts of these islands, particularly about Mactan, reefs can still be studied in early stage of upheaval, exposed even at lowest tides.” In another report, Becker took note of the reefs formed “terrace after terrace,” where in some portion they protruded by about eight feet above the water. These factors certainly complicated further the situation of the Spaniards.

These native settlements located on the north and northeastern portions, unlike in the rest of the islands, was located in a shoreline extending some two miles of stiff and clear waters, accessible for disembarkation. Some portions of steep rocks (cantiles) had depths ranging from ten to fifteen meters and six to eight meters in the narrowest shore of the bay which girded the northwest coast of the island. But Magellan’s problem was further complicated by the low tide where they had to wade “two good crossbow shots” towards the shore. According to Morison’s estimate, this was a little over a mile or a little more than one and a half kilometers. Out of the 60 soldiers he had, only 49 formed the assault team as the 11 remained in charge of the boats.

Except for Magellan, a veteran of bloody Portuguese campaigns in India, Malacca and Morocco, most of his men were composed of non-professional soldiers. As pointed out by a number of studies, although imbued with martial spirit, the men of Magellan sorely lacked teamwork, esprit the corps, coordination and unity. But worst of all, as many were serving in their capacity as mercenaries, employed by a government not of their own, and led by one hated by influential Spaniards and the crew, their corporate strength was greatly diminished.

The Spaniards’ estimate of the number of warriors who stood by on the shores of Mactan varied. The Genoese pilot, who wrote his memoir of the event, placed it between 3 to 4 thousand but Pigafetta’s “fifteen hundred” figure was closer to realistic demographic configuration of larger pre-colonial settlements. It has been a widely accepted historical fact that the native settlements found by the Spaniards were only composed of some 30 to 100 households or approximately 200 to 500 persons. Pigafetta’s demographic estimate therefore suggested that the number included allies from other villages ruled by 3 or 4 other chieftains. This fact refutes the traditional belief that Magellan’s only enemies were the men of Lapu-lapu.

The superior number of enemies on the shore of Mactan did not shake Magellan’s confidence as he even belittled the natives’ weapons made largely of “reeds, and wood hardened with fire.” Although native cannons called lantakas were known to the natives, Spanish accounts did not mention any of these as having been used by Lapu-lapu’s men. In the midst of such overwhelming number of enemies, Magellan encouraged his men to be brave by reminding them of the recent triumph of Hernan Cortes who defeated the thousands of Aztec warriors with only a few hundred soldiers. As Magellan prepared for battle, he divided his men in two groups who were greatly outnumbered but relied on the superiority of their arms.

Many historians had accused Magellan of foolhardiness and over- confidence in facing an overwhelmingly superior number of enemies with his small band of young, armored seafarers. But based on the inventory of armaments of the expedition, Magellan apparently envisioned engaging his enemies in a battle where, despite the Mactan warriors’ numerical superiority, the Spaniards still had an overwhelming tactical advantage, a long-range positional battle. Magellan had put faith on the fleet’s impressive array of massive artillery capable of sustaining a fierce battle both on land and on sea. A virtual floating arsenal, armed with the most powerful artillery of their time: 58 culverins of small bore (versos), seven falcones, 3 large Lombardy guns (lombardas gruesas), 3 cannons designed for battering down walls called pasamuros, aside from those cannons installed on the deck of the naos. But Magellan did not bring the ships which, according to Antonio de Brito, were located some 2 leagues away, approximately 8 kilometers, from where the battle was to take place. As to why Magellan did not allow the ships to come to provide them with artillery support if in case there was any need, remained a question. One probable reason was tactical, the towering heights of these ships would have betrayed their arrival and alerted Lapu-lapu’s men. Another was the difficulty involved in travelling in such huge and heavy vessels which could significantly delay their journey. The other was simply hubris.

Even the cynical Portuguese spy, Sebastian Alvarez, acknowledged the formidable firepower of the Armada, who wrote: “The artillery which they all carry are eighty guns, of a very small size; only in the largest ship, in which Magellan is going, there are four very good iron cannons.” The brief descriptions given by the Spanish mathematician, historian, and royal engineer to the Spanish king in Lombardy and Piedmont in 1592, Luis Collado, to some of these heavy weapons of the Magellan fleet provides a clue into their destructive capacity. Fed with 20, 34, 25, 30, 40, 50 pounds of cannon balls, the thick walled, long bores and heavy-powder charges culverins designed to strike the enemy from a long range could have an effective maximum reach of 6,666 yards. Another artillery known as the lombard was a cannon 12 feet in length, made of iron or bronze 2 inches thick, and held together by iron rings which threw balls of stone, as many as 140 a day, sometimes a foot in diameter weighing 175 pounds, or globe-shaped masses of inflammable ingredients mixed with gunpowder. This therefore required a specialized skill in handling the artillery.

For their body defenses, the crew were protected with 100 corselets, armors (armaduras de brazos), shoulder-piece of a coat of mail (espalderas), helmets (capacetes), 200 shields (rodelas) from Bilbao. A type of body armor consisting of small metal rings linked together in a pattern to form a mesh, the mail, was worn by Magellan and his soldiers. Even their small portable weapons were intended for long-range shooting. Except for 6 swords (hojas de espadas), all the rest were designed to be fired or launched at a certain distance from their enemy. At the time they departed from Seville, the ships carried 95 dozen of darts – missiles- harpoons (dardos), 10 dozen javelins (gorguzes), 1,000 lances, 200 pikes or a long lances (picas), 6 pitchfork and 6 handles of lances (astas de lanzas) from Bilbao. The sheer number of these weapons alone must have inspired great confidence in Magellan.

From these arrays of weapons, Magellan relied on two, one was the crossbow, described by the Second Lateran Council in 1139 as “a weapon hateful to God and unfit for Christians,” and was banned by the Church for military purposes, except when used against infidels. The ships carried 60 crossbows (ballestas) with 360 dozen darts/arrows (saetas) coming from Bilbao. The crossbow was a short, powerful bow mounted on a stock when bent pulled the string back and hooked in a notch on a rotating nut held in place by the upper tip of the trigger. A short arrow called a bolt is laid in the shallow channel on the tiller, and fired by the trigger, releasing the bowstring to propel the bolt on its course. A soldier could learn to shoot a crossbow easier than a skilled archer with the long bow. The average distance a target can be hit was estimated at 60 to 75 yards, or approximately 180 to 225 feet, but could reach 350 yards when pointed upward. Only extremely wet weather interfered with the archers.

The other weapon carried by Magellan’s men was the long portable gun, commonly known as the arquebus, although identified by Pigafetta as squiopeti and referred to in other documents as sclopas, sclopette, escopette or escopetas. This eventually evolved into the muschite and finally the word mousquet or musket. Invented around 1470, the arquebus was the first portable powder-fired weapon considered a great advancement in war. Cristobal Frisleva of Ricla in Aragon and Micerguillo of Seville were among the celebrated makers of arquebus in Spain. But it was also possible that the Spanish masters of this craft could have borrowed their skill from foreigners brought to Spain by Charles V such as the brothers Simon and Peter Markcuart, known in Spanish as Marcuarte.

The men of Magellan carried 50 of these firelock from Vizcaya, which explains why he only picked 49 to come with him. The fleet manifest also mentioned of espingarda, the precursor of the arquebus, musket or rifle introduced about the middle of the fifteenth century. With an estimated effective range of about 60 yards, the gun used black powder poured into the barrel and rammed to the bottom. To fire the gun, the shooter opened the cover of the pan and touched the lighted end of a wick, or match, to the fine priming powder. As this ignited, the flame passed through the hole in the barrel and set off the charge inside.

This long-arm weapon had its own disadvantages, as it used heavy bullets which took a long time to manipulate. The famous early twentieth century French historian, Fernand Braudel, noted that this rifle had to be rested on prongs, loaded and reloaded and the fuse lit. In some of the earliest types, the shooter simply held the match in his hand, a very unsatisfactory method, since when putting the match in the right place he had to take his eye off his target. Without friction matches in those days, a fire had to be kindled with flint and steel to light the wick, a slow and cumbersome process, requiring a continually burning match. The gunner also had to light both ends so that if one end went out, the priming powder could be kindled from the other end of the match. Vulnerable to water, the gun was useless during wet and windy weather, considered as the weapon’s major handicap.

Magellan’s men certainly encountered difficulties loading these weapons as they were in the sea. The major advantages of the gun lay in the psychological effect, its noise, flame, and smoke, the size of the hole it tore and the bones it smashed when it hit, plus its simultaneous multi- loading capacity. In close range, it could pierce even the armor of a knight and other heavy cavalry depending on the power of the arquebus and the quality of the armor.

As they advanced, Magellan’s musketeers and crossbowmen sustained firing for half an hour but, owing to their distance from the target estimated to be over 60 yards, they barely inflicted harm except for slight wounds on their enemies’ arms since the bullets and the arrows hardly penetrated their wooden shields. Seeing their ineffective efforts wasting precious bullets and arrows, Magellan ordered them to cease fire but “he was not listened to,’ wrote Pigafetta. On the part of the natives, this only encouraged them to advance while wildly shouting their war cries and “springing from one side to the other” met their outnumbered enemies to whom they were “throwing arrows, javelins, spears hardened in fire, stones, and even mud.’

Magellan’s men succeeded in approaching the coastal settlement still without incurring casualty until met by the advancing motley natives who ganged up on them. Magellan directed their efforts to dispersing these attackers by setting fire to their houses which, according to Pigafetta, “rendered them more ferocious.” Magellan’s incendiary strategy worked in deflecting attention from them since these warriors rushed to their burning houses, where some 20 or 30 of them were reduced to ashes, according to Pigafetta. The warriors directed their efforts to 2 of Magellan’s men torching the houses and were slain.

The boats carrying the artillery, which Magellan relied for tactical advantage, being too far from the beach, did not serve its purpose of providing cover. Based on Fernando Oliveira’s account, the natives were not able to approach them: “…as long as our gunpowder lasted, those of that land did not dare to close with them, but when it was used up, they surrounded us on all sides, and since they were incomparably more numerous, they prevailed, and our men were not able to defend themselves or escape, and fighting until they were exhausted,…” Correa wrote: “They acted with cunning, for they had placed ambuscades of men hidden in the bushes who, seeing the Castilian wearied, came out against them and killed many, and another ambuscade came out of the bush to seize the boats which were on the beach without men.’

The natives were actually leading them to a close-range combat which the Spaniards were absolutely unprepared and completely disadvantaged not only by number but even by experience. In this desperate situation, the group of Humabon, whom history had only depicted as mere spectators in obedience to Magellan’s order to simply watch them fought, actually became part of the battle as they intervened and provided support to the small beleaguered force of Magellan as recorded in the same chronicle of Correa: “then the king (Humabon) came out, and fought with them, and defended the boats, and brought off the men (ao que sayo o Rey, e pelejou com elles, e defendeo os bateys, e colheo a gente).” The natives of Mactan were nevertheless determined to fight as they divided themselves into 3 groups, attacking in both flanks and the third in front. It was in the middle of this fierce skirmish that Magellan’s mission finally came to an end.

The Death of Magellan

The Chilean historian, Jose Toribio Medina, blamed Magellan’s lack of reasonable judgement to a shocking spectacle, the death of Francisco Rabelo, whom he suspected of being the Captain-General’s biological son. Borrowing from del Cano’s narrative, another chronicler, the Augustinian missionary in Cebu in the early years of the seventeenth century, Fray Rodrigo Aganduru Moriz, made the same claim:

As a brave soldier, he was leading his men. While the fight between the Mactan warriors and Spanish soldiers raged with great courage, an arrow pierced through his bastard son, named Rebello, young and spirited, and was discharging his duty well, and thus fell dead, because the arrows were dipped in lethal poison. The father was overwhelmed with grief at the sight, went ahead of the small squad and rushed towards the Indio as if he were a madman, where with his sword and shield, although aided by our soldiers, the enemies had encircled him and snapped his life miserably.

As the natives continued their relentless assault, aware that despite the armor, the Spaniards were vulnerable in their legs, aimed their weapons on them, particularly their poisoned arrows, an important feature of their assemblage of war technology. Part of the Visayans’ technology of warfare even during Alcina’s time was the employment of poison for their arrows, drawn from the sap of certain herbs and plants. The most common from among these was taque, a milky or resinous substance from a tree called camandag but used mainly for the darts in the sumpit or blowgun. The milky sap from the pine or cheese wood called dita was another favorite poison for their arrows (habo labo luga -untar armas con yerbas como lanzas, punal, espada).

One of these poisoned arrows pierced Magellan’s right leg compelling the intrepid leader to order a gradual retreat but was ignored by his men who took a hasty flight, leaving behind 6 or 8 loyal soldiers to protect the wounded leader. As Magellan limped his way out on the shore but still pursued by the natives who continued to hurl their spears 5 or 6 times, the men succeeded in reaching “a distance of a crossbow shot from the shore,” or a little less than a kilometer from their boats. With waters still shallow, just above their knees, Magellan thought of maintaining their position, “without choosing to retreat further,” wrote Pigafetta.

Different sources provided varying versions of how Magellan died. The battle, according to Pigafetta, lasted for more than one hour which, having identified Magellan, directed their fury, knocking his helmet off his head twice, “but always stood firmly like a good knight, together with some others,” wrote Pigafetta. A native hit the captain’s face with a bamboo spear but before his assailant could inflict another wound, Magellan quickly killed him with his lance piercing through the chest which remained embedded. As he tried pulling out his other weapon, a sword, another bamboo spear hit his right arm, a signal for the natives to gang up on him. Although bleeding, Magellan tried to parry the attackers with his sword, only drawn halfway from the sheath. But a scimitar or a terzado, as Sweig called this bladed weapon, struck his left leg bringing the captain down on his face, a signal for the native warriors to “rush upon him and ran him through with lances and scimitars, and all the other arms which they had.”

Nicolas de Napoles, a companion of Magellan who made an official report of the event to the royal authorities dated 4 June 1529, provided a slightly different version of the captain’s death. Napoles testified that he saw Magellan, fighting with him on one side, killed by an arrow and struck by a lance on his throat. The chronicler, Antonio de Herrera, claimed that Magellan’s helmet was knocked out by a stone, exposing his head. As he was already weakened by the deep wound on his leg, the natives hurled stones at him which could have severely wounded his head, finally knocking him down. As he had fallen on the soil, Magellan was again struck by natives with their long bamboo lances or cañas indianas. The event was immortalized by a Chinese mestizo from Binondo named Carlos Calao in his 1614 poem:

Two Hundred cowardly men 
Cali Pulaco in command 
Like multitudes of sands before his eyes, 
with rocks and sticks they struck 
There fell the sublime Knight of the Fleece 
Against two hundred heartless savages 

Seeing the futility of fighting, as they were covered with wounds, Pigafetta and the few survivors scampered for the departing boats. As a loyal soldier and a faithful friend, Pigafetta looked at their abandoned leader and recalled his dying moments: “When they wounded him, he turned back many times to see whether we were all in the boats.” For Pigafetta to see Magellan’s dramatic gazes only suggested that the captain was on the ground as he was dragged away by the natives and expired when their boats disembarked: “Thereupon, beholding him dead, we, wounded, retreated, as best we could, to the boats, which were already pulling off.”

Obviously, the exact spot where Magellan fell, and the location of the battle was never identified by available contemporary sources. But in 1839, the Spanish colonial authorities made an intensive research on the place of Magellan’s death and the report concluded “the older natives claimed that according to their preserved tradition, with few variations, the said hero lost his life in the island of Mactan, in a sitio called Punta Pangusan or Punta del Engaño, a small promontory similar to the entrance to the Port of Cebu. “Exactly fifty years after the construction of his monument, Camilo de Arana’s marginal note indicated that it was a short distance to the southwest of Punta Pangusan, at the extreme north of the island of Mactan. The name Pangusan was a Visayan word which means “a nose eaten by leprosy (las bubas le an comido narizco).” The Punta Pangusan in Arana’s 1879 Derrotero described the shoreline as “low, clear but stiff (baja, limpia and acantilada),” located in the center of a cove fronting the coastal village of Lapu-lapu in between Pangusan and Opon.”

As it turned out, the battle proved a disaster. As Pigafetta reported: “There perished with him eight of our men, and four of the Indians, who had become Christians; we had also many wounded, among whom I must reckon myself.” Aside from Magellan, the recorded casualties in this battle were: Cristobal de Rabelo, Magellan’s servant and captain of the ship Victoria; Francisco de Espinosa, sailor; Juan de Torres, bearer of arms; Rodrigo Nieto; Anton Gallego, cabin boy; Pedro, servant of the Alguacil Gonzalo de Espinosa. Pigafetta received wounds on his forehead from a poisoned arrow which began to swell and caused him intense pain. Two days later, on 29 April, Antón de Escobar who survived the Battle of Mactan, eventually died from his wounds. On the part of the natives, Pigafetta reported having incurred only 15 dead and 24 injured.

But where was Lapu-lapu, what was he doing during the battle? Owing to his advanced age, Lapu-lapu was probably directing his men from a safer location which explains why all the accounts providing brief details on the battle were silent about his role. In fact, he was never mentioned at all. Except for the mention made by Sula prior to the attack of Magellan, Lapu-lapu vanished in history and any references to him by any other sources were purely speculation or derived from legends and oral traditions. This is another indication of Lapu-lapu’s deteriorated physical condition as an old man.

Assuming the post of Magellan, Juan Serrano and Duarte Barbosa were determined to secure the remains of the fallen commander. In the afternoon, Humabon, with the consent of the Spanish survivors, sent his emissaries to negotiate with the inhabitants of Mactan to secure the body of the captain and the other companions killed in that battle in exchange for some merchandise. But the defiant natives of the island arrogantly replied that “on no account would they ever give up that man, but they wished to preserve him as a monument of their triumph.”

As the most important person they ever defeated in battle, Magellan became the object of martial and talismanic rituals, particularly decapitation. Fray Rodrigo Aganduru Moriz was among the earliest to mention the decapitation of Magellan. According to this friar, Magellan was decapitated in accordance with the martial custom of the natives where the victor took a trophy, which was a major part of his body, commonly the head and placed it on the tip of a lance (lo quitaron la cabeza (estilo observado en estas islas), y poniendola sobre una lanza la llevaba el ejercito vencedor). The natives regarded the body of Magellan as their dangin, which, according to Fray Alonso de Mentrida’s sixteenth century Diccionario de la Lengua Bisaya, was “a trophy of their enemy killed or captured in war (blason, trofeo de enemigo, muerto o cautivo en guerra, la persona asi muerta o cautiva).” In a society which put premium on prestige and prowess not only as social virtues but also equated with mystical qualities, the body of Magellan constituted as the most valuable war booty. It was suggested that, based on the prevailing custom of the pre-conquest Visayan, Magellan was indeed decapitated, as they did to those they conquered, “which was their great desire,” wrote a seventeenth century Augustinian friar.

This Visayan practice of head-taking was an integral feature of their pre-colonial culture. This found confirmation in a number of excavations undertaken from the second half of the twentieth century until few years ago in what were supposedly fifteenth to sixteenth centuries burials in Tanjay, in the island of Negros. In this mass burial, archaeologists recovered not only entire skeletal remains but detached skulls regarded as grave accompaniments. These were presented as strong evidence for widespread inter-polity warfare and head-taking raids as part of political maneuvering and status rivalry among chiefs shortly before Spanish contacts. These human crania represented the heads of enemies captured in raiding or warfare, brought into the settlement and used in mortuary ritual, associated with the phrase coined by Laura Junker, “a precipitating mass death event.” This phrase refers to a large-scale massacre resulting from external raiding which provoked head-taking, through “revenge raids”.

In 1971, according to Morison, a skull was dug up on Mactan with the remains of a Spanish sword believed to be that of Magellan. Except for this, nothing else was found to provide extensive details to come up with reliable identification. As to what happened to Magellan, Sweig has this to say: “No one knows what became of Magellan’s body, or to which element his mortal envelope was returned; whether to fire, to water, to earth, or to air. No witness was there to tell us, and his grave, if he was buried, remains secret. All traces of the man who wrested its last mystery from the unknown have vanished.”

The death of Magellan in that historic Battle of Mactan reverberated not only within the realms of the Spanish empire but throughout the learned circles of the world. The outpouring of mixed reactions did not end with the men who heard of this news during his time but continued throughout history. The first to feel the impact of his death were his crew and thus regarded the event as the definitive end of their journey. In the words of his most faithful admirer and follower, Pigafetta, Magellan was “our mirror, our light, our comfort, and our true guide.” Indeed, the purpose for which the expedition was launched had to be abandoned, but only temporarily. With his death, Pigafetta could only hope through the efforts of the king that “the fame of so noble a captain will not become effaced in our times.”

Magellan’s death was received by Humabon with great sadness, as Pigafetta recalled: “When he knew how the captain had died, he wept bitterly for him.” Humabon’s grief demands qualification. Did he sincerely grieve for his fallen ally out of affection or was it for the bleak prospect he foresaw for his rule which could emanate from Magellan’s death? No one else felt so much pain for Magellan’s death than his wife, Beatriz, who learned of this tragic news more than a year after. Beatriz, the tragic heroine in the story of the Magellan expedition, had to bear the anguish and bitterness of consecutive deaths of two of her most beloved persons. First was their young boy, Rodrigo, and barely a year after, that of her husband, Magellan.

Historians in various parts of the world tried to make sense of Magellan’s defeat. Some condemned him for his arrogance and over confidence which caused him to underestimate the martial capacity of the natives. Among the most bitter critics of Magellan even until his death were the eminent Spanish personalities of his time. One of the council members of the Consejo de la Indias, Peter Martyr of Angleria, contemptuously remarked that “the good Portuguese Magellan had concluded his odor, greed.”

Most interpreted his death as a great loss for the empire-building project of Spain. With his demise, Magellan delivered to the islands the ultimate and most precious cargo of the expedition, himself. It thus signalled Spain’s abortive efforts at the conquest of the islands. Others saw in his death the fullness of his heroic character. George Makepeace Towle, an eminent nineteenth century American lawyer, politician, and author, wrote in his children’s edition of Magellan biography:

Unlike Pizarro, and many other voyagers of his time, his ambition was nobler than that of the greed of gain; nor was it confined to winning fame and honor for himself. He aspired to confer great benefits upon man. He exulted in the thought that he might serve Christianity and civilization. He would find unknown pathways on the seas; he would plant the cross in heathen and idolatrous lands; and these high and unselfish aims he pursued with an ardor and intrepidity not. surpassed by any of the world’s conquerors and heroes.

Others saw in his death a more transcendental implication. Padre Francisco Colin, the seventeenth century Jesuit chronicler, writing more than a hundred years after Magellan, offered a more religious significance for his death:

That one may see, so to speak, that Magellan was not chosen by God for another discovery, nor of any conquest other than in the Philippines, that the thread of life of the great captain be cut and buried not elsewhere but in this island, as a seed of the generous plant of the gospel and Spanish settlement which God plants for this island.

Magellan’s death served as God’s manifestation of His predilection for the islands. By his death, the islands became the only beacon of faith in this part of Asia not only during Magellan’s time or even during Colin’s missionary work but even until the present.

In his Anales de Aragon, the sixteenth century chronicler, Leonardo Argensola, claimed that the emperor was deeply grieved by the news of Magellan’s death. The great joy the discovery brought him was greatly diminished by Magellan’s death. According to Argensola, it was in Mactan where Magellan’s indomitable spirit, which had endured so much difficulties, overcame conspiracies, suffered varying climates, waylaid by nature, but gave up in the inclement rudeness of the semi-barbaric natives’ arrow point without receiving the prize he rightfully merited.

Subsequent historians paid homage to the greatness of Magellan. One Chinese Spanish poet, a resident of Binondo in the early seventeenth century wrote a poem in 1614, a little less than a hundred years after Magellan’s death, “Que Dios Le Perdone,” he dedicated to Magellan. In his poem, Calao poured out his anger to Magellan’s killers, particularly Lapu- lapu but extolled Magellan’s services to the natives and to God. He saw in Magellan’s death the work of the devil through the instrumentality of the native heathen, the chief Lapu-lapu. He wrote:

Invited by Captain Magellan 
To be in service to the true God 
To serve us; 
But alas; that evil king named Cali Pulaco 
Not wishing to see nor feel 
Faith's gift to us, thus killed him, 
But his death was not in vain, 
O noble conqueror! 
The Child Jesus in Cebu enthroned, 
From where bloomed the flower which today 
perfumes his martyrdom. 
But to the traitor's memory, 
Only Magellan's death 
For such, was another act of treachery. 

Seen from the native lenses, even in the later period of Philippine history, the death of Magellan was regarded as the triumph of native resistance to imperialist pretensions of the Europeans and hailed Lapu-lapu not only as its rallying point but its hero. In the later part of the Spanish regime, the greatest accolade was made by one of the most prominent intellectuals in the islands, T.H. Pardo de Tavera, He wrote: “There is no doubt that the man to whom we owed our contact with the civilized world was a true calumnied hero, as it also happened few years after to the Great Christopher Columbus.”

The header image features “Battle and Victory in Mactan“ by Derrick C. Macutay, a muralist and contemporary painter (Oil on canvas, 36″ x 48″, 2020, Dr. Rowen T. Yolo, M.D. collection)

About the author

DR. DANILO MADRID GERONA spent years of serious research in various archives in the Philippines and Europe. As a historian, Prof. Gerona has devoted a substantial part of his work in the study of the early history of Bicol and the Spanish colonial era in the Philippines. He is the only non-Spanish member of Sevilla 2019-2022, a multicultural committee based in Seville City, which spearheaded and coordinated the global celebration of the 5th centenary of the Magellan-Elcano’s circumnavigation of the world. He is currently a member of the faculty in the Graduate School of the Universidad de Santa Isabel in Naga City and a Research Associate of the University of San Carlos Press in Cebu City. Click the link below to purchase his book, Ferdinand Magellan: The Armada de Maluco and the European Discovery of the Philippines.